Limitations Of Agency Theory Finance Essay

Limitations Of Agency Theory Finance Essay Irrespective of the recent well-deserved criticism of Agency Theory I believe it should still play an important role in managerial remuneration. Empirical evidence supports the theory that a conflict of interest exists between shareholders and management. Throughout recent years one of the more commonly discussed management topics has been executive compensation and in particular the size of bonuses awarded to CEOs and other senior management. Agency theory can be considered to be the most widely used theory to explain executive compensation. The focus of Agency theory is on ways to make the governance system of corporations more efficient so that shareholders interests and performance expectations are given every chance to be realised by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). An agency problem may arise between managers and shareholders because the principals (the shareholders) cannot adequately monitor the actions taken by the agent (the managers). Subsequently, the agent can have an incentive to pursue their own interests, rather than the bet interests of the principal. Given the body of evidence, it would be naÃÆ' ¯ve to claim that agency theory has not made a significant contribution to the principal-agent literature. However it does have its limitations and a new approach is needed to use the benefits of agency theory to its fullest. By realizing agency theorys limitations, we can add to its strength. Droege, Scott B A key issue facing agency theory is the reliance that stakeholders have on the board of directors. This has proven to be an unhealthy reliance and the level of independance of some board of direcors can be questioned. This is discussed by Band (xxxx) when he noted that while there is a common perception that the board is independent, this is often fake as noted by Pearce and Zahra who found that over 85% of Fortune 500 industrial companies had Chairmen who had also served as the corporations CEO. It is well documented that executive compensation packages should be designed to align the interests of senior management with those of the shareholders and thereby reduce the dysfunctional behaviour of managers; this is typically done by rewarding executives for taking decisions and actions that increase shareholder wealth ([26] Mortlock, 2009). Unfortunately, the shareholders (and directors) may have neither complete information about the actions of executives or the expertise to evaluate those actions, making it difficult to base compensation on actions alone. Instead, compensation in practice is often linked to measures that are positively correlated with managerial performance, for instance market share, share price or accounting profit. Additionally In recent years Boards have become weaker as more power has been distributed to senior management. This has resulted in the decline of the accountability of Directors and a resulting impact in the decline of the monitoring role of Boards. Corporate Governance David Band The board of directors is heavily reliant on the information provided by the CEO. The recent spate of failures among both financial and non-financial companies has been accompanied by a growing interest in and concern about the compensation of the CEOs of major U.S. corporations. This, in turn, has reignited interest among both academics and financial practitioners about agency theory issues, especially the question of whether or not the total compensation of CEOs is properly scaled in relation to the earnings they generate for the shareholders they serve. We find that the executive remuneration design derived from a single agency perspective is insufficient. Prospect theory, real option theory and managerial power approach all together would complement agency theory to bring the theory of executive remuneration closer to reality Adam Notes Agency Theory or Stewardship theory Limitations of Agency theory Irrespective of the recent well-deserved criticism of Agency Theory I believe it should still play an important role in managerial remuneration. Empirical evidence supports the theory that a conflict of interest exists between shareholders and management. The board still functions on information provided by the CEO. While there is a common perception that the board is independent, this is often fake as noted by Pearce and Zahra who found that over 85% of Fortune 500 industrial companies had Chairmen who had also served as the corporations CEO. In recent years Boards have become weaker as more power has been distributed to senior management. This has resulted in the decline of the accountability of Directors and a resulting impact in the decline of the monitoring role of Boards. Corporate Governance David Band The appropriate remedy for the problem of the potentially self-interested or incompetent managerial team is said to be the monitoring board. But frankly, no one really knows what is the optimal level of option grant: what level of stock option compensation will make an executive risk-neutral like the shareholders, or willing to bite the bullet on layoffs, or willing to accept a premium bid? Even if the stock price falls back, the well-timed executive option exercise is a life-changing experience. More formally, the Black-Scholes option pricing model instructs us that the value of the executives stock option will be increasing both in the value of the underlying security and the variance (since stock options are issued at the money). So managers with a rich load of options have incentives to get the stock price high by any means necessary, fraud included. In particular, they have incentives to increase the riskiness of the firm, including projects that offer lower expected returns but higher variance. This will reduce the value of the firm for risk-neutral shareholders but has the potential to increase the value of managers firm-related investments in cases where the gain in option holdings exceeds the loss to human capital. Managers become risk-preferring. Enron Jeffrey Gordon Prospect theory, real option theory and the managerial power approach all together would complement agency theory to bring the theory of executive remuneration closer to reality. On the other hand, theoretically, being the main stream theory of corporate governance, agency theory suggests effective executive remuneration should align managers interests with shareholders interests in order to minimize agency costs (Florackis, 2005; Bayless,2009). Most remuneration frameworks in the literature have been largely influenced by agency theory. However, notable divergences exist between thepredictions of agency theory and reality. There is a need to extend agency theory with some complementary theories to make executive compensation more realistic. We find that the executive remuneration design derived from a single agency perspective is insufficient. Prospect theory, real option theory and managerial power approach all together would complement agency theory to bring the theory of executive remuneration closer to reality. Che, Zhang,Xiao and Li Empirical support for agency theory has been demonstrated in numerous settings. For example, Eisenhardts (1988) studies of retail stores show support for agency theory in salaried and commissioned salespeople. Acquisitions and divestitures were the focus of a study by Argawal and Mandelker ( 1 987). Conlon and Parks ( 1 990) examined performance-contingent compensation as the dependent variable and found support for agency theory. Support has been found in interorganizational joint ventures (BalakrishnanandKoza, 1993) and franchising (e.g., Agrawal and LaI, 1995). Although not an exhaustive review, this brief list gives adequate evidence that agency theory has been empirically tested and supported in a variety of contexts from retail sales to manufacturing to joint ventures. Given this body of evidence, it would be naÃÆ' ¯ve to claim that agency theory has not made a contribution to the principal-agent literature. Indeed, it has made a significant contribution. Thus, it is not my intent to discredit agency theory. However, a rational course is to separate the premises and examine them in a new light. By realizing agency theorys limitations, we can add to its strength. Droege, Scott B Agency theory can be considered to be the most widely used theory to explain executive1 compensation. Agency theory, from economics, focuses on ways to make the governance system of a corporation more efficient so that shareholders interests and performance expectations are realized by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The failure to find a consistent link between executive compensation and a firms performance has motivated some authors to supplement agency theory with other theories originating in psychology and sociology (e.g., Ungson and Steers, 1984; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Bainbridge, 2005; Gomez- Mejia et al., 2005; and Perkins, 2008). It should be explicitly mentioned here that it is not our objective to replace agency theory with other theories. Rather, we recommend adding other theoretical lenses, originating in other paradigms, to make our understanding of executive compensation more complete. While discussing each of the theories, it will become clear that rather than taking a single theory perspective, it is preferable to take a multi-theory approach to explain the complexities of executive compensation. This is also a logical consequence of the use of three paradigms. Under such an approach, different paradigms and theories together serve to explain executive compensation better and more completely than opting for a single theory or paradigm. Over the last decades, hundreds of studies have been published in the field of executive compensation. Agency theory was found to be the dominant framework. This theory puts forward the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation as one of the mechanisms to reduce agency costs. The inability to find a consistent relationship between performance and executive compensation, however, has given rise to the development of alternative theories. The most popular alternative theories include managerialism theory, institutional theory and contingency theory. Strong support was found for taking such a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary view of executive compensation. The control perspective (agency theory), which has historically been the main perspective, has to be enriched with behavioral, institutional and contingency factors. Baeten, Xavier; Balkin, David In the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) governments lost confidence in market fundamentalism and realised the inadequacies of regulatory measures. The purpose of this paper is to outline the proximate causes of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and to investigate the role of the shareholder wealth maximization (SWM) objective in the GFC. The case studies revealed that unethical behaviour, agency issues, CEO compensation, creative accounting and risk shifting are some of the side effects of SWM. These cases indicate that the assumptions on which SWM are based are questionable. Further, it can be argued that the root cause of the GFC is excessive greed and the single-minded pursuit of SWM. The global financial crisis (GFC), which had been threatening for some time, began to display its effects in the middle of 2007 and into 2008. Around the world, stock markets have fallen, large financial institutions have collapsed or been bought out, and governments in even the wealthiest nations have had to develop with rescue packages to bail out their financial systems. Had all boards of directors being successful in their assigned role of protecting all stakeholders of the firm, rather than just shareholders, then we believe that the GFC would have been avoided. Most business concern is focused on profit maximisation. However, profit maximisation fails for a number of well-known reasons; it ignores: the timing of returns; the cash flows available to shareholders; and risk. Without explicitly considering these factors, higher earnings alone do not necessarily translate into higher share prices. Damodaran (1999) explains that, in the real world, managers perform the decision-making function with four factors or linkages in mind: shareholders, bondholders, society and financial markets. Competitive market conditions place significant pressure on agents and managers who will be tempted to resort to unethical means to portray a positive picture. It is acknowledged that the wealth maximisation objective is not always compatible with a firms social obligations, and it usually involves an agency problem which arises when the managers fail to act in the best interests of the shareholders, preferring instead to benefit themselves ([20] Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Differences in the objectives of ownership and management lead to agency costs; if these are to be controlled, the shareholders must maintain a strict watch over the functioning of the company. The managers should be rewarded for acting in the interests of the shareholders and the managers should maintain a balance between the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders. In this context, the GFC highlighted the important influence that incentive structures within financial institutions and other businesses can have on risk-taking and financial performance. In particular, it highlighted the dangers of badly designed remuneration incentive arrangements leading to excessive risk-taking, poor financial performance and a bias towards short-term results at the expense of longer-term financial soundness ([26] Mortlock, 2009). It is well documented that executive compensation packages should be designed to align the interests of senior management with those of the shareholders and thereby reduce the dysfunctional behaviour of managers; this is typically done by rewarding executives for taking decisions and actions that increase shareholder wealth ([26] Mortlock, 2009). Unfortunately, the shareholders (and directors) may have neither complete information about the actions of executives or the expertise to evaluate those actions, making it difficult to base compensation on actions alone. Instead, compensation in practice is often linked to measures that are positively correlated with managerial performance, for instance market share, share price or accounting profit. Stock options became an ever greater part of executives compensation, increasing from 27 per cent in 1992 to 60 per cent in 2000. Fixed salary will reduce the risk to the executives and guarantee a standard of living. On the other hand, it may not encourage them to improve their performance in order to maximise shareholder wealth. The use of golden handshake and golden parachute clauses in management contracts may also be driven by managers acting to further their own interests, rather than those of their shareholders. [25] Matsumura and Shin (2005) characterized conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers as usually arising in three broad areas. First, executives enjoy (as well as exploit) the perquisites provided to them. Second, executives are more risk averse in decision making and aim for better compensation as a trade-off. Lastly, executives are more interested in making decisions that have short-term impacts rather than taking a long-term perspective. By designing executive packages in a way that balances the interests of shareholders and executives, these conflicts can be reduced. The packages should be so designed to motivate the executives, whilst at the same time allowing management to control the amount spent on compensation, based on the performance of the CEOs themselves. [26] Mortlock (2009) notes that the major financial and corporate sector distress seen in the USA and Europe in recent times is partly attributable to poorly designed remuneration incentive arrangements. An examination of history reveals that a range of practices, unrelated to any major improvement in cash flows and/or profits, have been carried out with the intention of increasing wealth; for example: accounting manoeuvres with deceitful intention and accounting fraud (in the case of Xerox), improper accounting, deviation from accounting principles with deceitful intention, leveraging of shares to raise debt for expensive acquisitions (as in the case of WorldCom), stretching the limits of accounting by misusing its limitations, lack of transparency, intentional projection of a rosy picture of performance (in the cases of Enron and Arthur Anderson), massive fraud, accounting scandal (in the case of Peregrine Systems), aggressive acquisition strategies and accounting frauds (in the case of Tyco), diverting business cash into off-shore, family-owned entities, artificial support given to the stock of the company (in the case of Polly Peck), deceitful intention of elite and experienced h ands with sophisticated outlets (in the case of BCCI banks) and highly leveraged synthetic financial instruments (in the case of Goldman Sachs). Creative accounting is the manipulation of financial numbers, usually within the letter of the law and accounting standards, although its use can be unethical and does not provide the true and fair view of a company that accounts are supposed to provide ([45] Moneyterms, 2009). Common to all the cases mentioned above was managements single-minded focus on SWM. By attempting to grow the company at high speed and by using creative accounting techniques, managers had failed to foresee the detrimental affect these actions would have in the long term. It is clear that, in light of the side effects of SWM as discussed in Section 4 particularly their impact during the crisis the validity of the above assumptions has become questionable. In this regard, [19] Jenkins and Guerrera (2010) argue that the recent SEC attack on Goldman Sachs strikes at the heart of the business model, a model that, as [46] Friedman (1970) states, views the social responsibility of business being to increase its profits. However, as an agent, a manager is bound to act to maximise the wealth of shareholders, rather than to follow an agenda of social responsibility. It is clear that major issues like unethical behaviour, executive compensation, creative accounting and conflicts of interest, pushed the big entities towards major difficulties and, in many cases, collapse. Though a series of accounting regulations were designed and directed, many giant organisations found convenient loopholes to take advantage of or, if this was not possible, resorted to manipulative means, actions which ultimately contributed substantively to the financial crisis. Hull (2009) argues that the inappropriateness of extant incentive schemes led to a short-term focus in the managerial decision making. Given this situation, in February 2009, US President Barack Obama introduced new restrictions on executive compensation for institutions that receive financial assistance from the government, by limiting cash compensation to US$500,000; similarly, the USs Financial Stability Board released a set of principles aimed to ensuring effective governance of compensation and the effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk taking. These developments in turn suggest that the SWM objective is neither self-regulatory nor flawless in nature. As we have discussed in this paper, the reasons for the burst of this financial bubble are many. However, most of the factors are (directly or indirectly) linked to the pursuit of SWM. The above discussion has shown that each factor had in common the desire to increase the value of owners wealth. It appears reasonable to argue that, by forgetting the importance of ethics and deviating from accounting principles, the greed paid off. Risk shifting and dysfunctional behaviour are some of the side effects and flaws in an SWM-based system that is not self-regulatory. Because of a strong focus on profit maximisation or even SWM, the corporate decisions that led to the economic downturn were never balanced with any good citizen approach. But value maximisation alone is no longer sufficient in todays competitive global business environment; organisations need to focus on objectives that have long-term benefits rather than short-term value. By taking stakeholders and society into consideration a firm will truly begin to create sustainable wealth; while the corporate objective function is dominated by SWM this cannot take place. Yahanpath, Noel Supporters of agency theory underscore, among its positive features, the realism with which it describes relationships among individuals in a company(Eisenhardt, 1989). The firm is no longer considered as a single, monolithic actor but the complex set of interactions among several individuals. The firm is now presented as a nexus of contracts between principals and agents (Maitland, 1994; Shankman,1999). Typically, there are different goals and interests among individuals involved in an agency relationship. Agency theory presupposes that individuals are opportunistic, that is, they constantly aim to maximize their own interests (Bohren, 1998). Thus, there is no guarantee that agents will always act in the best interests of principals. Rather, there is a constant temptation for agents to maximize their own interests, even at the expense of principals. Under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty prevalent in business settings two kinds of problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). Adverse selection refers to the possibility of agents misrepresenting their ability to do the work agreed; in other words, agents may adopt decisions inconsistent with the contractual goals that embody their principals preferences. Moral hazard, on the other hand, refers to the danger of agents not putting forth their best efforts or shirking from their tasks. This divergence between the interests of the principal and the agent unavoidably generates costs. Agency costs are residual costs that result in a failure to maximize the principal_s wealth. These may be incurred by the principal through measures to control the agent_s behaviour or by the agent through efforts to demonstrate his commitment to the principal_s goals. The whole point behind agency theory is to come up with mechanisms that ensure an efficient alignment of interests between agent and principal, thereby reducing agency costs (Shankman, 1999, p.321). Principals are thus challenged to design contracts that protect their interests and maximize their utility in case of conflict. These contracts are based on several assumptions regarding agents (self-interest, limited rationality, risk aversion), organizations (goal conflict between members) and information (asymmetrical) (Shankman, 1999, p. 332). Supporters of agency theory underscore, among itspositive features, the realism with which it describes relationships among individuals in a company (Eisenhardt, 1989). The firm is no longer considered as a single, monolithic actor but the complex set of interactions among several individuals. Methodologically, agency theory subscribes to individualism: its basic unit of analysis is the human being fully constituted as an individual and bereft of any social dimension. In every endeavour individual agents seek above all their own utility (utilitarianism) or pleasure (hedonism), the satisfaction of their own desires. They form groups not to fulfil any requirement of their proper flourishing as human beings but only to further their particular interests (contractualism). Outside of this, agents do not subscribe to any moral imperative; they willingly engage in immoral conduct whenever convenient. Acting morally would be reasonable only if it presented a greater economic incentive in terms of utility and pleasure than the contrary (Bohren, 1998). Joan Fontrodona, Alejo Jose ´ G. Sison The recent spate of failures among both financial and non-financial companies has been accompanied by a growing interest in and concern about the compensation of the CEOs of major U.S. corporations. This, in turn, has reignited interest among both academics and financial practitioners about agency theory issues, especially the question of whether or not the total compensation of CEOs is properly scaled in relation to the earnings they generate for the shareholders they serve. Our null hypothesis, consistent with the popular assumption in the media, is that the secular growth of CEO compensation has become increasingly misaligned with the earnings results that CEOs have produced for shareholders. Surprisingly, our initial findings, drawing on secular trends among SP 500 firms, appear to show that our hypothesis does not hold, and that, over an extended period of time, CEOs have not received compensation that is out of line with the their companies earnings trends. Zhao, Kevin M; Baum, Charles L; Ford, William F 2.0 Diagnosis of Problems and Theoretical Analysis 2.1 Organisational Change 2.2 Conflict Cognitive Dissonance 2.3 Communication 2.4 Leadership 3.0 Recommendations 3.1 Organisational Change Management Recommendations 3.2. Conflict Management Recommendations 3.3. Communication Recommendations 4.0. Conclusion

“Examine the View That the Family Is Universal”

George Murdock examined the institution of the family in a wide range of society. Murdock took a sample of 250 societies of different cultures and discovered that there was some form of the nuclear family which existed in every society. Murdock then concluded that the family is universal and provides four function. Sexual(stable relationship for adults), reproduction(continuing to create more society members), economic (pools resources to provide for each other), socialisation (teaches norms and values of society).Kathleen Gough disagreed with Murdock statement that the family is universal since she investigated a society in India called the Nayar who were an exception to the family. For example sandbanham relationships were not lifelong unions, either party could terminate the relationship at any time, sunbanham husbands had no duty towards the offspring’s of their wives, husband and wives did not form an economic unit. Husbands were not expected to maintain their wives. This society was a matrilineal society. in terms of Murdock definition of the family, no family existed in the nayar society since those who maintained a sexually approved relationship did not live together and cooperate economically.Another type of family known as the martifocal familles are considered an expection to murdocks defintion of the family as some children are raised in a household that do not contain men and are headed by females. For example a significant proprtion of black familles in the island of the west indies(Guyana).female headed familles are oftern known as the matriarchal family.Another type of family which may go against murdock definition of the family is gay and lesbian families.murodck claimed the household will contain â€Å"two of both sexes† however lesbian and gay household contain a union from the same gender.In conclusion although the nuclear family, the ideal type of family from the new rights perspective is found in every society. Not all househ old consist of this particular family. Therefore the nuclear family in my opinion is not unversal since it is not found in every household.

Personal Theory Paper Essay

Throughout my experience my current course, Theories and Practices: Human Services in Criminal Justice, I have learned plenty of information about the various theories of psychotherapy in counseling. Some of these theories operate on the basis of recognizing errors in thinking and correcting those errors. Other theories operate on the basis of multiculturalism and the fact that all clients are unique and deserve to be treated as such. As a result of learning from my readings and of my discussions with class mates, I was able to create my own intervention theory for counseling. Explanation of Theory and why I believe in it Any student in a human service course should be able to develop his or her own intervention theory by the time the course ends. My personal theory will involve both cognitive and multicultural approaches to therapy. Cognitive approaches to therapy operate on the assumption that by correcting the clients’ faulty beliefs, they can learn to behave more appropriately, how to think differently, and how to act on these learnings (Jones-Smith, 2012). On the other hand, Multicultural approaches to therapy suggest that counseling theories represent various views of the world with their own values, biases, and assumptions about human behavior, and that all clients are unique in some way and that their individual differences must be both accepted and respected (Jones-Smith, 2012). I believe in combining these approaches to therapy for my theory for a few reasons. First, I have always thought that offenders within the criminal justice system need to recognize their errors in thinking before they will be able to change their behaviors to be in accordance with the law. Plus, as a future employee of the criminal justice system who will most likely be working in human services, I need to be able to work with clients from various cultural backgrounds and  to accept and recognized their differences. Combining these two theories is the best way for me to be able to help all of my future potential clients in the best way possible. Theories and Theorists I Relate the Most to and why After reading all of the material for this course, I found that I relate to a few of the theories and theorist better than I do others. For instance, I found that I can relate to Albert Ellis and his Rational Emotive Behavior Theory or REBT. One of the reasons that I can relate to this theory and theorist is because it is a cognitive approach to therapy, which I think is very important for offenders to take part in for the best chances of living a crime-free life. Plus, REBT is based on the belief that people are born with a potential for irrational or rational thinking (Jones-Smith, 2012). In addition, REBT maintains that people are born constructivists and have a great deal of resources for human growth (Jones-Smith, 2012). I have always made these assumptions about people, which is also why I can relate to this theory. I can also relate to Ho’s theory of internalized culture, which suggests that the formations of our worldviews are influenced by eternalized culture (Jones-Smith, 2012). In addition, the theory suggests that effective multicultural counseling is based on the counselor’s ability to go beyond the boundaries and limitations of his or her personal culture (Jones-Smith, 2012). I can relate to this because I think that it is necessary to be able to look past my personal beliefs and experiences to be able to help a wide range of clients. Relating to these theories and theorists has helped me to develop my own personal intervention theory that I will be able to use in my future career. What Surprised me most about the Theories and why Some of the theories and concepts from this course took me by surprise. For instance, it took me by surprise that there are theories and theorists created specifically for feminist and the LGBT communities. Although I realize that all types of people have issues that they need to address in therapy, I never thought that specific therapeutic techniques were developed for feminist and LGBT communities. However, it does make sense that the LGBT community would have certain issues that other people may not have to face. In addition, I was a bit surprised at the variety of theories and  approaches that are used for Asians, Muslims, and Arabs. What surprised me about these theories is that they were very different from many of the theories generally used by our culture. In addition, I did not fully understand how the differences in these cultures played such a large role in how to approach these populations with therapy. However, I did find them interesting, and considered many of the concepts for use in my personal intervention theory. Even though these theories took me by surprise, I recognize their importance in psychotherapy approaches to counseling. Conclusion All of the theories of psychotherapy discussed in this course are effective for specific people with specific needs. Despite the fact that some of the theories were surprising, they all have merit and can be effective with the right client. Even though I recognize the importance of all of the theories and theorists, I was able to relate to some more than others. After relating to certain theories and theorists, I was able to develop my own personal intervention theory based on cognitive and multicultural approaches to therapy. My personal intervention theory, along with the rest of the theories and concepts discussed in this course will guide me along my journey of employment as a juvenile probation officer in the future. References Jones-Smith, E. (2012). Theories of Counseling and Psychotherapy: An Integrative Approach. Sage Publications.

How to Make Academic Posters

How to Make Academic Posters How to Produce an Effective Academic Poster The aim of academic posters is to share information at conferences, seminars, and exhibitions. They can tell about some complex issues, and thus it is essential that the information on them is well-organized, readable, and eye-catching. While creating a poster, it is critical to take care not only about its visual appearance but also about its content. Main approaches to producing college posters Approach 1 One-piece method involves creating a poster in one large piece. The design is elaborated by means of different software applications, such as Microsoft Powerpoint. It is usually performed in A3 or A4 size and after that is enlarged at the printout stage. Approach 2 Panel method The distributed poster space is broken down into some separate panels. It can be comprised of such elements as text, images, tables, or titles. Standard word-processor and presentation software are the best tools for this method. The panel method can be flexibly used and adjusted to changing layouts. This approach is attention-grabbing and makes your poster distinct from the rest. Steps to Creating a Poster Step One Deciding on the content The first step is to understand your assignment and identify the type of information that you will use in your poster. These questions may come in handy:What is the purpose of your poster to present findings, put forward an argument, persuade an audience, or endorse a product? Who is interested in your poster? What is your audience searching for elaborate information or a concise summary? Where will your poster be displayed? Is there any instruction with the defined content of your poster?Step Two Drawing an outline Having defined the content of your poster, you should think of the way your information will be displayed. By drawing an outline, you can wisely use the space allocated. Structure Your structure must be comprehensible and logical so that viewers could easily follow the flow of information in your poster. To provide a readable flow of information, consider mapping out your poster on a grid system. Creating your poster design Having laid out the parts of your poster, you need to print out roughs of the text, use scissors, and glue to cut things out. It will help you to apply different sequences and spacings to see the exact quantity of information required for an efficient display. Step Three Creating your final poster Having decided on the location of your information, you can start working on your final poster. To achieve good results, you need to be knowledgeable about some design principles of organizing your material. Sticking to them will secure you a good feedback from your teacher. How to Create a Powerpoint Template? Once you are done with writing your text, you need to think of its presentation. There are 5 key points to take care of:Font. Pick a font that is readable from a great distance. Most of the usual fonts are appropriate for this (e.g. Helvetica, Palatino, Times). Avoid applying too many fonts since it can look scruffy. Two is a happy medium; one for the headings and one for the main information. Type size. Keep in mind that your poster will be viewed by people standing at around a meter away and thus the text should be easily read at a distance. Apply large type sizes (24 and 36 points). Titles and headings should be more sizeable than your main text. Try to minimize the number of type sizes. Otherwise, your paper will look awkward. Line spacing or leading. Applying one and a half or double spacing between lines makes your poster design more legible. Alignment. Most word-processing packages enable you to align your text in various ways on the page; you can choose between left, right, center, and justified. Try not to resort to alignments since it can sometimes look out of place. Left aligned is the best to read, especially when applying a large type. Case. Text in UPPER CASE is hard to read, even being very close to the presentation, and thus it is better to avoid it.Color pattern Colors can make poster design appear in a new light, and provide you with a new method of underlining some aspects of your information. Pick colors that correspond to each other so that they do not distract from the information in your poster. Do not apply a miscellany of colors, otherwise, your poster will look messy. Diagrams Presenting your information on a poster enables you to show your data in a riveting and creative way. Think of how you can improve your poster by means of pictures, tables, charts, or photos. The insertion of even one well-chosen picture can significantly make your audience more interested in your poster. Step Four Presenting your poster Poster presentations can be performed in many ways. You may be asked to stand near your poster, conversing with people as they browse and answering questions about the information you presented. Also, your poster can be just a part of a general display. You can come up with some ways of helping interested viewers to take information away from your poster: making printed A4 copies of one-piece posters or short summaries of panel posters are indeed efficient ways of communicating your information. Summary Creating academic posters is an extremely effective way of putting across information to a great majority of people. However, it can be quite challenging to create a poster that is both visually attractive and informative. Still, if you take pains to make an engaging and interesting poster, you are certain to reap outstanding results.

Naval Role in the American Civil War essays

Naval Role in the American Civil War essays Three days after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, on April 15, 1861, Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand volunteers to enlist for three months. Soon after he called for additional forty-two thousand men to sign on for three years, and provided large increases in the army and navy budgets. With an unlimited budget for both army and navy, lack of planning in the North and poor resources in the South meant that the campaign at sea got off to a slow start. Also, valuable time was needed to build up navies from scratch. The Union Navy received an increase of eighteen thousand men, and in July, as it became obvious that this was not going to be a short campaign, Lincoln asked for additional four hundred thousand men for the army and navy. Once started, the South organized more quickly than the North as it established a navy after the first states had seceded. By August 1861 Stephen R. Mallory, the Confederate Secretary of the Navy had already contracted for several powerful vessels in the west. Here again the South was well in advance of the North. A few problems would arise for the south after a good start. Few Southern shipyards were of sufficient size, and plants for the manufacture of machinery and armor were also in need of. Of the ten yards belonging to the US Navy in 1860, only two were in the South. One at Norfolk which was a great facility, having constructed thirteen major warships before 1861. Then a smaller one at Pensacola, which was better, used to refitting vessels, but it had built several large warships in the past. But even this large output of warships would not be enough when compared with the enormous shipbuilding resources of the Union, which had many well-equipped naval yards, and a large supply of private companies. Many small concerns continued to spring up in the South, but these were often located on a riverbank due to the frequently lacked adequate facilities. In 1860 there...

Health care of vulnerable persons Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

Health care of vulnerable persons - Essay Example It can be due to individual capacities, such as level of educational attainment, income or wealth, and mental or physical capabilities. For example, those who have lower levels of educational attainment have significantly less knowledge or preparation to deal with disasters, and are thus vulnerable. The availability of support is also a significant factor in vulnerability. Those who have no families or social networks to rely on are more prone to being harmed than those who can draw support from others. Access to neighbourhood and community resources is also an important factor in assessing whether an individual or group is vulnerable. Other sources of vulnerability may include poverty and race and physical location. This is largely related to access to resources and care. This paper focuses on children who are victims of abuse as a vulnerable group. Children, due to their developmental state, are very fragile. They are usually weaker than adults, are less mentally developed, and hav e no or little means to defend themselves. Due to their age, physical and mental limitations, they are more dependent on others, making them susceptible to abuse and neglect (Reichert 2006). The Child Welfare Information Gateway (2009) defines child abuse as consisting of acts of parents or caretakers that result in death or harm of a child. It may also include the omission of certain acts, or neglect to do something. There are several types of abuse: physical, neglect or failure to provide for a child’s needs, sexual or exploitation, and emotional. Some states also include parental substance abuse as a form of child abuse. There are certain risk factors that make a child susceptible to abuse. Goldman et al (2003) describes four general categories of risk factors: parent or caregiver factors, family factors, child factors, and environmental factors. Parent factors include personality traits such as aggression, impatience, or dominance, and psychological disorders. A personal history of abuse, substance abuse, and faulty attitudes and knowledge are also factors. Families with single parents or constantly changing compositions have been found to be more prone to having abused children. Marital conflict and domestic violence, presence of stress, and flawed parent-child interactions are also risk factors. Child factors that contribute to child abuse are age, developmental stage, and presence of disabilities. Environmental factors include poverty, unemployment, social isolation, lack of social support, and being in dangerous neighbourhoods. This paper describes policies that work towards helping child abuse victims. It also goes into strategies that would prevent child abuse, offer help for victims, and address their vulnerabilities. Policies In 1989, the United Nations created the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which specifies the basic rights that every child, regardless of race or gender, should enjoy. Among these rights are: a right not to be dis criminated against; a right to have best interests primarily considered; a right to a name, nationality, and parents; a right to have own views and freely express self; a right to be free from interference with privacy; a right to adequate health care, education, rest, and leisure; and, most relevant to this paper, a right to be protected from abuse (Reichert 2006). Since the creation of the Convention on

Create an alternative ending for Hunger Game Essay

Create an alternative ending for Hunger Game - Essay Example Having not played the role, the ending let me down. This led to the writing of my preferred alternative ending that tries to cover all these aspects that the author failed to take into account during his original work’s end. The entire work of Collins is admirable but as it comes to the ending of the story, the author looks like he ran out of steam and needed to end the story as fast as possible. I think about Dr. Aurelius’ advice about letting go or at least trying to let go, of anger and hurt, blame, not for anyone else but my right. He believes that my feelings of resentment and hate inside myself that makes me want to shut everyone out will only grow like poison inside me. I think about the last few weeks of my troubles only feeling worse the more I ponder on it. Other citizens of District 12 like Greasy Sae seem to be hopeful about President Paylor’s suggestions on the new laws being arranged to offer equality throughout Panem. Everyone seems to be satisfied, except the few survivors from the Capitol, who have had to learn to live with fewer luxuries now that resources are being shared more evenly. Things in Panem are brightening up. I feel a part of me wanting to share in this bright er future but the shadowed feelings of guilt and despair weigh heavier on me and tell me I don’t deserve to share in it, after all, the pain I caused and the deaths of those who believed in me. What were they thinking? What did they observe in me that was any good? And how do I let this go? Gale’s last comment to Peeta â€Å"Katniss will pick whoever she thinks she can’t survive without.† still gives me chills and annoys me a little. But then I have to remind myself that he had every right to feel hurt. He was always waiting by my side. Waiting for me to decide but never forcing me to choose just patiently waiting. I think about this again and try to search within myself for the truth. ‘Who can